The retaliatory strikes in and the sustained bombing begun in early probably contributed to some degree to boosting the morale of the hard pressed South Vietnamese government. This study of the effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam in achieving the goals set for it by those involved in making the bombing policy necessarily neglects many relevant considerations. These include civilian casualties, the international impact of the bombing, the risks of escalation and provoking Chinese or Soviet intervention, the costs of the bombing, captured airmen, and the consequences within the United States.
But in so doing, the study places in a starker light the high hopes held out for the bombing and the small results actually achieved. Throughout the war, the results of the bombing of North Vietnam have consistently fallen far short of the claims made for it. The bombing began with the expectation that it would break the will of the enemy—although many questioned its capability to do so. When Hanoi showed no signs of weakening, the rationale shifted toward interdiction, but this goal, too, proved unobtainable.
Many suggested that this failure was because there were too many restrictions. But again North Vietnam proved capable of adapting; the will of the Hanoi leadership held strong. Again bombing failed to fulfill the promises made for it. This study should contain two warning notes. First, the focus of this study has been on interdiction and strategic bombing of North Vietnam during the period It does not consider tactical air support, which has been relatively successful in achieving its goals.
Neither does it consider the current air war against North Vietnam, which is far heavier than previous offensives. No reliable information is yet available on its success or failure. Second, the experience in Vietnam cannot be readily transferred to other situations. In overcoming the effects of the bombing, the North Vietnamese have had certain advantages which may not apply to other cases.
The leadership has shown great tenacity and high motivation, as well as exceptional ingenuity and adaptability in coping with the effects of the bombing.
The evident control and organization of the society, together with apparently high popular support have made possible this tenacity and adaptability. Equally important has been the willingness and ability of other Communist countries to provide sufficient military and economic aid.
The location of North Vietnam has also been of considerable importance. Bordering on an ally, China, North Vietnam could not be blockaded; land transportation routes were available. Moreover, the proximity to China long tended to moderate US escalation of the air war because of the fear of Chinese intervention. The common border with South Vietnam and the relatively unpopulated and heavily foliated border area with Laos facilitate infiltration and make interdiction bombing more difficult.
The original guerrilla nature of the war long reduced the amount of supplies which had to be infiltrated, thus reducing the burden on the North. And finally, the underdeveloped nature of the Vietnamese economy has provided relatively few valuable targets for bombing.
These caveats notwithstanding, this study calls into serious question the efficacy of strategic and interdiction bombing against a highly motivated guerilla enemy in an underdeveloped country.
Bombing appears capable of raising the costs of war to an enemy in such a situation, but it cannot be depended on to weaken his will or to substantially reduce his activity by interdicting his supplies. Compared to the damage to US prestige and the internal division created by the bombing policy, its meager gain must be seriously questioned. But because the footnotes were recently declassified by the Department of Defense, they are cited in this study.
JCSM , 18 Jan. Pentagon historian, ibid. JCSM , 10 Nov. SNIE , Dec. Quoted in The Washington Post, Feb. E hereafter cited as NSSM1. Another study put the total manpower diversion over a three year period at , Emphasis in original.
Even this probably ov erstates the cost, however. Even if the pre-bombing capital stock were only replaced, it would be more modern and productive than it otherwise would have been. IV , ibid. E and E, and No. The other four volumes remained classified on the grounds that disclosure of the materials they cover—the history of negotiations—would be detrimental to the national interest.
Hollick, have been engaged in a careful review of the 7, pages of documents and analysis included in US-Vietnam Relations. They have had at their disposal both the classified and unclassified versions of the Pentagon Papers. Biles is an analysis of the efforts of the United States to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war during a critical period of military escalation.
But because the lessons which this history provides are important and should be available to the American public, I requested the cooperation of the Department of State in declassifying the staff study in whole or in part. This request was originally made on January 10, After considerable delay, the Department of State replied that it could not concur in the declassification of this staff study.
Assistant Secretary Abshire wrote on March 9, that. I found the position of the Department unacceptable. On March 27, , I wrote Secretary Rogers that. I therefore requested that the Secretary designate a responsible individual from the Department to discuss its specific objections with the Committee staff.
In view of this position by the Department of State, this study is being made available only to Committee Members as a classified Committee Print. It should be noted for the record, however, that the Washington Post on June 26 published large portions of the classified portion of the four volumes which form the basis of this study.
The press also reported that the Justice Department apparently has no intention of prosecuting the Post. The study shows that both the United States and North Vietnam sought military victory and placed little faith in negotiations. There was a gradual and erratic movement toward compromise and a lessening of demands by both sides during the period But the basic stumbling block—who was to control South Vietnam—remained unsettled, just as it is still unsettled today.
The study points up the mutual suspicions, the misinterpretations, and the missed opportunities which marked the course of negotiations. It makes clear that both sides used the negotiating tricks for propaganda purposes while placing their major hopes in military victory. January Called State to check on status of declassification. February 1: Interim reply from State—letter.
February Telephone conversation with State. February Letter to State noting continuing releases by former officials. February Marcy telephone conversation with Symmes of State. March 7: Marcy telephone conversations with Symmes of State. March 9: Letter from State refusing cooperation in declassification. March Marcy telephoned Symmes to discuss possibility of line-by-line declassification.
March Marcy telephoned Symmes, who said he had put the matter before Abshire. March Letter sent to State suggesting line-by-line declassification. April Marcy telephoned Wright and then sent letter informally. April Marcy telephoned Wright to check status of request.
June Marcy telephoned Wright to check status of request. June Letter from State again refusing declassification. August Mr. Schnee of State returned call to say diplomatic volumes and study are still classified. January 10, Hon. William P. In reading the study, however, I find no reason for its remaining classified. It contains information about which the public should be informed, and I note nothing in it which would in any way endanger national security if it were disclosed.
We hope that this declassification will be accomplished as quickly as possible. If we may be of any assistance in this effort, please contact Mr.
Robert Biles of the Committee staff. Sincerely yours, J. Fulbright, Chairman Attachment. The report is now being studied by appropriate officials in the Department.
We shall be pleased to inform you of our views as soon as this review is completed. Sincerely yours, David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
February 17, David M. I have received your interim reply of February 1, In view of the increasing frequency of disclosure of details of the negotiations by former administration officials, there is an ever decreasing justification for the continued classification of this material. Moreover, as the Department has been able to examine our staff study for over a month now, I expect a substantive reply to be forthcoming shortly.
Fulbright, Chairman. As stated in my interim reply of February 1, the Department has been reviewing this report. As you have noted, it is based in large measure on the still classified volumes of the Pentagon study relating to negotiations. These volumes contain detailed accounts of the roles played by foreign governments and other third parties in establishing secret channels between the United States and North Viet-Nam, including the full substance of confidential discussions with these third parties and critical assessments of their activities by US Government analysts.
To disclose these secret channels and official communications relating to them would constitute a unilateral violation of confidentiality in diplomatic intercourse without which the diplomatic process cannot function effectively. Moreover, such disclosure could harm and perhaps preclude future use of these and other channels in our continuing efforts to deal with the issues of the Indochina conflict including that of our prisoners of war.
I am very sorry that we cannot concur with your request, since I well realize the diligent and extremely capable efforts of the professional staff that gone into the preparation of this report. March 27, By contrast with the secret negotiations between Mr.
The lessons which this history provides, however, are important and should be available to the American public. I would like to know promptly what specific parts of this study the Department feels should remain classified, and why. The matter has already been subject to inexplicable delay on the part of the Department of State. In order to resolve the question without further delay, I ask that you designate a responsible individual from the Department to discuss its specific objections with the Committee staff.
If there are sound reasons for the continued classification of portions of the study, it should be possible to delete or rewrite those specific items.
April 20, This matter has dragged on for three and a half months, and I see no reason for continued procrastination. After considerable delay, several telephone calls, and another letter, you replied on March 9 that the Department could not concur in the declassification of the study. In order to find out the specific portions of the study to which the Department objected, I proposed to Mr.
Symmes of your office on March 14 that you name someone to discuss the study with the Committee staff. I spoke with Mr. Symmes by telephone again on March 22 to urge swift action.
He said that he had taken the matter up with you but that no decision had yet been made. In the hopes of spurring a decision, Senator Fulbright wrote Secretary Rogers on March 27 to reiterate the request in the strongest terms. Yet, time passes and still there is no response. Let me again emphasize that it is important that the substance of this study be made available to the American public. If there are sound reasons for the continued classification of portions of the report, it should be possible to eliminate them.
But the inexplicable delay on the part of the Department of State is preventing the resolution of the problem. Sincerely, Carl Marcy. In response to your request, I am enclosing a copy of the report with those portions identified in red pencil. The reasons for their continued classification remain as outlined in my letter of March 9, As I pointed out in that letter, to disclose these secret channels and official communications relating to them—and I might add the official analysis based upon them—would constitute a unilateral violation of confidentiality in diplomatic intercourse and, moreover, could injure future effective use of these and other channels.
I am very sorry that we are unable to accommodate your request with regard in this matter. Naval History and Heritage Command. Print Friendly. The Sextant. Social Media. Toggle left navigation Nav. Toggle navigation Menu. Today it is not the armies but whole nations which make war; and all civilians are belligerents and all are exposed to the hazards of war.
The only salvation will be in caves, but those caves cannot hold entire cities, fleets, railways, bridges, industries, etc. Mitchell was disingenuous about making the civilian population a chief target in air warfare. He also argued air power could make war less destructive than older forms of warfare. Superior air power will cause such havoc, in the opposing country that a long drawn out campaign will be impossible.
But terror bombing of the civilian population of an enemy in order to break its morale, was central to air power strategy. Douhet was more forthcoming about how air power would inflict terror from the skies on the civilian population. The question of the morality of air warfare — subjecting civilian populations to devastation and terror — was addressed briefly at the turn of the 20th century.
As breakthroughs in aircraft technology were made, however, international efforts to restrict the bombing of civilian populations fell by the wayside. The first major effort to put limitations on aerial bombardment took place at an international conference at the Hague in The temporary ban was adopted. But before the temporary ban on aerial bombardment voted at the Hague conference expired, technological development undermined support for the effort.
Wilbur and Orville Wright proved in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, that flight by heavier-than-air machines was possible. This raised the possibility of bombing from airplanes in addition to aerial bombing from lighter-than-air balloons. France, Germany and Italy were also well on their way to developing dirigibles which would be more navigable and suitable to air warfare than balloons which were used in early air campaigns.
When a second conference was convened at the Hague in , there were more proposals for a prohibition of aerial bombardment. A French resolution for placing restrictions on the use of air power, instead of banning it outright, was adopted by the conferees.
Article 24 of the Convention of Land Warfare, however, allowed attackers to notify an undefended city before bombing it to give the city a chance to surrender.
Other questions regarding air war were also left unanswered or ambiguous. What if an undefended city contained a military objective like an arsenal, legal experts asked? Some legal scholars thought at the time that aircraft should be governed by the laws which regulated bombardment by naval artillery.
Attacking fleets were permitted to bombard military targets in an undefended city as long as they restricted their fire to military installations. Civilian casualties were heavy, but there was no new international attempt to outlaw the bombing of civilian populations. International Security ; 45 2 : — We replicated a key question of this study, where respondents were asked if they would support saturation bombing an Iranian city to end a war.
We also introduced some variations into the experiment to directly measure any potential influence of international norms and laws. Overall, our quantitative and qualitative findings are more optimistic than those of Sagan and Valentino's study: Americans do strongly believe it is wrong to target civilians.
And in a real-life scenario such as this, a majority would likely oppose such a bombing. These findings suggest, however, that much depends on how survey questions are structured in measuring those preferences and whether legal or ethical considerations are part of any national conversation about war policy. Sign In or Create an Account.
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